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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAf!Clerk. Supremo Co"rt !J'bb 
WILLIAM C. HOYLE , et al. , 
Plaintiff-Respondents, 
vs. 
DAVID S. MONSON, Lieutenant 
Governor-Secretary of State, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MEMORANDUM OF ADDITIONAL 
AUTHORITIES 
Case Nos. 16133 
16134 
Pursuant to Rule 75(p)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, respondents, through their substituted counsel, 
respectfully submit the following additional authorities in 
support of their position, for the assistance of the Court. 
It is well-established that the right to vote is a 
'fundamental right", and that any state infringement of that 
right will be "strictly scrutinized" for a "compelling state 
interest". Harper v. Virginia Board of Education, 383 U.S. 663 
(1966); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
The right to be a candidate for office is intimately connected 
with the right to vote, and is also a "fundamental right". It 
derives its status not only from the Fourteenth Amendment "right 
of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to 
cast their votes effectively", but also from the First Amendment 
"right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political 
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beliefs." Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). Accord-
ingly, the courts in the following cases dealing with ballot 
access claims have held candidacy rights to be fundamental, thus 
requiring strict scrutiny of the challenged election restrictions: 
Duncantell v. City of Houston, 333 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Tex. 1971); 
Gonzales v. City of Sinton, 319 F. Supp. 189 (S.D. Tex. 1970); 
Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 318 F. Supp. 1262 (S.D. Ohio 1970); 
aff'd sub nom., Sweetenham v. Gilligan, 409 U.S. 942 (1972); 
Thomas v. Mims, 317 F. Supp. 179 (S.D. Ala. 1970); Socialist 
Workers Party v. Rockefeller, 314 F. Supp. 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), 
aff'd 400 U.S. 806 (1970); Jenness v. Little, 306 F. Supp. 925 
(N.D. Ga. 1969), appeal dismissed, 397 U.S. 94 (1970); Mancuso 
v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187 (1st Cir. 1973); Minielly v. State, 242 
Ore. 490, 411 P.2d 69 (1966). See also, Bullock v. Carter, 405 
U.S. 134 (1972), discussed in respondent's main brief, which, 
although ambiguous in parts, appears to conduct its analysis under 
the "close scrutiny" standard. 
In addition to Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974), 
the following cases, dealing specifically with challenges to 
candidate filing fee requirements, hold that filing fee statutes 
providing no reasonable alternative method of gaining access to 
the ballot are unconstitutional under equal protection concepts: 
!@nier v. Vance, 342 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ala. 1972); Stoner v. Forston, 
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359 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp. 
729 (D. N.M. 1972); Jenness v. Little, supra; Thomas v. Mims, 
supra; Duncantell v. City of Houston, supra; Socialist Workers 
~ty v. ~·Telch, 334 F. Supp. 179 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Johnston v. Luna, 
338 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Tex. 1972); Brown v. North Carolina State 
Board of Elections, 394 F. Supp. 359 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Fair v. 
Taylor, 359 F. Supp. 304 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Knoll v. Davidson, 12 
Cal. 3d 335, 116 Cal. Rptr. 97, 525 P. 2d 1273 (1974). 
Respondent submits the State must show not only that the 
imposition of the filing fees under § 20-3-14 is necessary to 
the State's interest in restricting candidate access (Bullock v. 
Carter, supra), but also that the alternative of allowing write-in 
votes under § 20-7-20 is a reasonable alternative. The State has 
not even attempted to make such a showing, and the provision for 
write-in voting is clearly not a reasonable alternative to name 
placement on the ballot. The courts in S?cialist Workers Party 
v. Welch, supra, Jenness v. Little, supra, and Carter v. Dies, 
321 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd, Bullock v. Carter, 
supra, all specifically rejected such a write-in alternative as 
constitutionally acceptable. In addition, three cormnentators on 
the validity of candidate filing fees have concluded that a man-
datory filing fee provision, such as in § 20-3-14, coupled only 
with a write-in procedure, is unconstitutional. See, Comment, 
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b 
The Constitutionality of Qualifying Fees for Political Candidates, 
120 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 109 (1971); Note, The Constitutionality 
of Candidate Filing Fees, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 558 (1972); Jardine, 
Ballot Access Rights: The Constitutional Status of the Right to 
Run for Office, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 290. The rationale is clear: 
a write-in candidate is inherently and obviously prejudiced by 
the absence of his name on the ballot, as opposed to candidates 
whose names do appear thereon. Thus, the write-in alternative to 
paying a fee for name placement on the ballot does not remove the 
discrmination against the indigent candidate--it in effect contin-
ues it. A write-in alternative can never, as a simple matter of 
fairness, be constitutionally sufficient to justify a filing fee 
scheme such as § 2 0-3-14: 
To force a candidate to rely on write-ins 
is to burden him with disability. It makes it 
more difficult for him to get elected, and for 
the voters to elect him. Williams v. Rhodes, 
393 U.S. 23, 37 (1968)(separate opinion of 
Douglas, J.) . 
As stated by one commentator: 
. [B]ecause a write-in candidate's name does 
not appear on the ballot, it stretches the word 
to call this provision a viable "alternative" to 
name placement. The state simply provides no al-
ternative, in the sense of a sufficient substi-
tute, when it gives the fee-paying candidate a 
place on the ballot and gives the candidate who 
does not pay the fee nothing but the promise to 
count his votes. Comment, The Constitutionality 
of Qualifving Fees for Political Candidates, supra, 
at 130-131. 
Agreeing with the above authorities, the United States 
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supreme Court in Lubin v. Panish, supra, specifically recognized 
the constitutional insufficiency of an alternative write-in pro-
cedure such as exists in the Utah statute: 
It is suggested that a write-in proce-
dure, under [the election code], without 
a filing fee would be an adequate alterna-
tive to California's present filing-fee re-
quirement. The realities of the electoral 
process, however, strongly suggest that 
"access" via write-in votes falls far short 
of access in terms of having the name of the 
candidate on the ballot. It would allow an 
affluent candidate to put his name before 
the voters on the ballot by paying a filing 
fee while the indigent, relegated to the 
write-in provision, would be forced to rest 
his chances solely upon those voters who would 
remember his name and take the affirmative 
step of writing it on the ballot. That dis-
parity would, itself, give rise to constitu-
tional questions and, although we need not 
decide the issue, the intimation that a 
write-in provision without the filing fee re-
quired by [the election code] would constitute 
"an acceptable alternative" appears dubious at 
best. Id. at 720. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the above additional 
authorities compel the conclusion the district court was correct 
in concluding § 20-3-14 is unconstitutional. The statute, in 
effect, sells name placement on the ballot, which is tantamount 
to selling the only real chance to become an officeholder; this 
discrimination by the State against respondents and others unable 
to Pay the filing fees cannot be tolerated. 
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DATED this~ day of October, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BERMAN & GIAUQUE 
B 
Colin P. King, 
Attorneys for 'P{aintiff-
Respondents '-...__ ____ .,... 
500 Kearns Building -
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES were hand-
delivered to the following this ~ day of October, 1979: 
Joseph P. McCarthy 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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